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On May 23, 2003, Toronto experienced the second
phase of a severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS) out-
break. Ninety cases were confirmed, and >620 potential
cases were managed. More than 9,000 persons had con-
tact with confirmed or potential case-patients; many
required quarantine. The main hospital involved during the
second outbreak was North York General Hospital. We
review this hospital’s response to, and management of, this
outbreak, including such factors as building preparation
and engineering, personnel, departmental workload, poli-
cies and documentation, infection control, personal protec-
tive equipment, training and education, public health,
management and administration, follow-up of SARS
patients, and psychological and psychosocial management
and research. We also make recommendations for other
institutions to prepare for future outbreaks, regardless of
their origin.
O
n March 5, 2003, the first patient with severe acute
respiratory syndrome (SARS) died in Toronto,
Ontario, Canada. This index patient was a 78-year-old
woman who, upon returning to Toronto from Hong Kong,
transmitted the new variant coronavirus to her family (1).
On March 7, her son was admitted to the hospital, and he
subsequently died on March 13. His unrecognized disease
led to nosocomial transmission of this disease in Toronto
(1). As of August 28, 2003, a total of 375 cases of suspect-
ed and probable SARS had been identified in Toronto;
most of these cases occurred within healthcare facilities
(1–3). A minority of cases were related to household and
community transmission, most acquired after hospital vis-
its. The last community-acquired case of SARS-associated
coronavirus (SARS-CoV) infection was identified on
April 13, 2003 (2). 
On the basis of the absence of new cases two incubation
periods after the last case, barrier precautions were down-
graded in Toronto hospitals on May 8, 2003. However, on
May 23, the medical community realized that nosocomial
transmission of SARS to patients and visitors had been
occurring on a single ward in North York General Hospital
(NYGH) throughout April and early May (3). Staff had
been protected by personal protective equipment and there-
fore, because of the absence of staff cases and an epidemi-
ologic link, the identification of the cases was delayed.
On May 23, a second phase of the outbreak (SARS II)
was declared at NYGH, and the hospital was designated
as a level-3 institution, which indicated that SARS had
been transmitted through unprotected exposure (3).
Consequently, a 10-day work quarantine for all staff was
imposed. While this action prevented a major staffing
shortage, it required all staff to wear N95 respirators at all
times in the facility. When not at work, staff were at home,
in home quarantine. During SARS II at NYGH, 55
patients were admitted with a diagnosis of SARS, and
another 200 patients were assessed in the emergency
department. We discuss the multidisciplinary and cross-
departmental response used to establish SARS care at
NYGH and offer recommendations that may help other
hospitals prepare for an outbreak of SARS or any other
infectious agent. 
Building Preparation and Engineering
Wards
At the peak of SARS II, NYGH had 46 patients with
investigated, suspected, or probable SARS in respiratory
isolation in private, negative-pressure rooms (4). This was
accomplished because two nearly constructed, empty, hos-
pital wings were available. Within 72 hours of the declared
outbreak, two units were converted into SARS wards, one
with 22 rooms, the other with 27. Each private, negative-
pressure room had no drapes and contained minimal equip-
ment: one chair, a bedside table, a hamper for discarded
linen, a garbage bin for contaminated equipment, and a
hand sanitizer. Outside each room, a table held the person-
al protective equipment for staff entering the rooms.
Outside each SARS ward were change-rooms for staff to
change in and out of scrubs at the beginning and end of
each shift. 
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We learned that the intensive care unit (ICU)’s capaci-
ty is one of the factors that governs the number of SARS
patients a hospital can manage. Since approximately 20%
of patients with SARS require ICU care, the maximum
number of patients with SARS that a hospital can manage
can be calculated (5). At NYGH, the ICU’s capacity was
22 rooms, which allowed the care of approximately 80
SARS patients in the hospital at any time. The ICU had
private, self-contained, glass-enclosed rooms. The adja-
cent ward was a clean unit containing the standard ICU
equipment as well as tables with personal protective equip-
ment. Outside the ICU, a change-room was stocked with
fresh scrubs and linen-disposal bins. 
Emergency Department and SARS Assessment Clinic
Similar principles were applied to the emergency
department, which had eight private, negative-pressure
rooms. This department was closed to the public because of
the hospital’s level-3 status but stayed open for hospital
employees and recently discharged patients. At the request
of the provincial government, a SARS clinic was estab-
lished to assess members of the public with symptoms of
SARS. This clinic was constructed within 1 week in the
1,782–square foot ambulance bay. It contained eight nega-
tive-pressure isolation rooms built with pipe framing and
plastic walls and ceilings. Areas for clerical work, registra-
tion, and changing personal protective equipment were
also created. Other components included an area for case
review, a lead-lined x-ray room, and an x-ray viewing
room. A40–x 20–foot tent was placed at the entrance of the
clinic to provide ample space for a waiting area (Figure 1). 
Engineering and Maintenance
The above-mentioned wards were considered SARS
units, and the same engineering principles were applied to
each. Each patient’s room met the minimum requirement
of six air changes per hour. Twice daily, the engineering
department tested the negative-pressure status in all SARS
units and patient rooms and presented the results to the
hospital administration. In addition, an external company
conducted daily assessments of the air circulation within
the rooms. Highly trained engineering staff and clear blue-
prints and plans of the facility’s ventilation system were
needed to implement all the required changes.
We recommend that hospitals take the following build-
ing preparation and engineering steps to prepare for an
emerging infectious disease: 1) complete an assessment of
their current facilities and capabilities; 2) ensure that cur-
rent blueprints of the facility’s ventilation system are
always accessible to facilitate expedient changes; 3) work
with all relevant departments, including the proposed
wards, ICU, and emergency department, to develop a strat-
egy that allows for the rapid construction or conversion of
the maximum number of private, negative-pressure rooms;
and 4) identify in advance a timeline and areas of respon-
sibility for constructing the maximum number of private
rooms.
Personnel 
Our biggest challenge during the outbreak was insuffi-
cient personnel. Most personnel were required at the
beginning of each phase and were then needed for approx-
imately 3-1/2 weeks. Although more personnel were
recruited, they did not start work for 1 to 2 weeks after the
initial influx of patients. We required additional nurses,
unit managers, infection control personnel, housekeeping
staff, ward clerks, and supply stocking and inventory staff.
772 Emerging Infectious Diseases • www.cdc.gov/eid • Vol. 10, No. 5, May 2004
PERSPECTIVES
Figure 1. Tent assessment clinic built on ambulance loading dock
for assessment of the general public for any symptom suggestive
of severe acute respiratory syndrome. A, 40- x 20-foot tent con-
structed on the ambulance bay of the emergency department pro-
vided a spacious waiting area adjacent to the clinic area; B, inside
the tent, eight cubicles were constructed with metal pipe frames
and thick plastic walls, each ventilated with a custom-built ventila-
tion system.
A
BPhysicians recruited to manage the outbreak included pri-
mary-care doctors, infectious diseases consultants, hospi-
tal epidemiologists, public health physicians, emergency
department physicians, and radiologists.
Nursing Staff
On the SARS wards, we aimed for a high ratio of nurs-
es to patients. At the beginning of the outbreak, the ratio
was approximately 4–5 patients per nurse, a potentially
dangerous ratio that could lead to transmission. During
SARS II, the ratio was 1:1 if the patient was on oxygen
requiring hourly monitoring and 2:1 for more stable
patients. In the ICU, the ratio was two nurses per patient,
which allowed for one nurse in the room and another out-
side. To avoid transmission, nurses were extensively
trained in SARS patient care, the use of personal protective
equipment, the potential risks for transmission, and pre-
paredness for high levels of stress.
Housekeeping
Dedicated and well-trained housekeepers were very
important during the outbreak. Our housekeepers were
trained in proper cleaning techniques and the use of per-
sonal protective equipment. 
Physicians
At NYGH, we used a most responsible physician
(MRP) model for patient care, i.e., a primary care doctor
(including emergency department physicians, general
internists, family physicians, surgeons, and anesthesiolo-
gists who volunteered to care for SARS patients) directly
cared for the patients. The patient-to-physician ratio for
the MRP was 5–10 SARS patients per physician. One
infectious disease consultant was assigned to each SARS
ward, and one also covered the SARS ICU for a ratio of 20
to 30 SARS patients per infectious disease consultant. The
MRP conducted all direct patient care, reviewed all cases,
wrote the notes and, at mid-day, reviewed all cases with
the infectious disease consultant, who was also responsi-
ble for alerting the MRP of new developments pertinent to
SARS, for making changes in patient management, con-
sulting with the emergency department for SARS assess-
ments, and communicating with the onsite public health
physician and outbreak management team. Training the
emergency department physicians in SARS procedures
was vital; our emergency department physicians became
adept at evaluating potential SARS cases, which resulted
in fewer patients being referred to infectious disease
consultants.
We recommend that hospitals take the following per-
sonnel steps in advance of an emerging infectious disease
event: 1) Calculate the maximum number of beds available
for conversion to negative-pressure rooms on the wards, in
the ICU, and the emergency department. The resulting fig-
ure will indicate the number of staff (including nurses,
allied healthcare workers, and physicians) required from
day 1. 2) Develop a system to identify those staff members
who would be available to start working as part of the out-
break team within 24 hours. Such staff must be prepared
for training and able to commit their services for a mini-
mum of 3 to 4 weeks. 3) Generate a plan to meet the extra
cost of hiring vital personnel (the greatest economic cost
during such an outbreak). 4) Prepare for intensive training
of both skilled staff and all other hospital employees in the
use of personal protective equipment and infection-control
procedures.
Departmental Work Load
The SARS outbreak affected every hospital depart-
ment. After NYGH was identified as a level-3 institution,
only the two SARS units, the SARS ICU and the emer-
gency department, continued to function. Most non-SARS
patients were discharged, which left only 20 patients in this
400-bed hospital. However, every department’s continued
contribution was needed. Occupational health played a
major role in reviewing which healthcare workers could
return to work. Environmental services and housekeeping
were greatly affected by additional requirements through-
out the hospital. Security ensured that unauthorized per-
sons did not enter the hospital; a security staff member,
with a nurse, escorted SARS patients on transports
between departments, logging the date, time, and persons
involved in the transfer. Because of the isolation measures,
SARS patients’x-rays were taken with portable machines;
two technicians were needed. The laboratory was over-
loaded due to the increased number of daily samples,
which required a blood technician system to collect all
samples at 7:00 a.m. Pharmacy staff handled increased
orders and organized Health Canada’s approval require-
ments for ribavirin and interferon.
We recommend that hospitals conduct a review of each
department’s existing capacity and capabilities for han-
dling an outbreak. Strategies should then be developed to
address any deficiencies. 
Policies, Procedures, and Documentation
During the outbreak, Toronto hospitals developed stan-
dardized systems for all implicated procedures, including
code blues, patient transfers, and other infection-control
procedures. 
Of vital importance was the policy for patient oxygena-
tion and early transfer to the ICU. SARS patients in need
of oxygen can deteriorate rapidly, requiring intubations
within 6 to 12 hours, a high-risk procedure that can lead to
further nosocomial transmission (6). At NYGH, patients
who had an oxygen saturation <92% and needed any
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oxygen saturation monitored every 2 hours instead of
every 4 (6). If patients required more than 4 L/min of oxy-
gen, the monitoring increased to every hour. Once patients
required >6 L/min of oxygen, they were transferred to the
ICU. Such early transfer allowed for elective, early intuba-
tion to be done in a controlled environment by minimal
staff, which resulted in a reduced risk for transmission.
Staff at intubations wore T4 Personal Protection Systems
(Stryker Instruments, Kalamazoo, MI), although these
items were not proven to be beneficial (6).
Specific standardized forms were developed, including
emergency department SARS consult sheets that included
all the appropriate key questions regarding exposure, date
of onset of symptoms, specific symptoms, laboratory
investigations, and chest x-ray findings; admission order
forms, which allowed for standard orders for the nurses
and MRPs (see Appendix, online only; available from:
www.cdc.gov/ncidod/eid/vol10no5/03-0717_app.htm);
and progress note forms, which documented symptoms,
temperature, oxygen saturation and requirement, laborato-
ry and x-ray results, and the daily plan. These documents
both streamlined the process of daily review of 10 to 20
patients and standardized the level of care. 
We recommend that hospitals do the following: 1) con-
sider obtaining existing documentation and policies from
other hospitals, such as NYGH; 2) develop an organized
process of documentation that will facilitate an organized
response to patient needs; and 3) assess different systems
equivalent to the T4 Personal Protection Systems(Stryker
Instruments) for particle removal efficiency and air-flow
rate to choose the optimal system before an outbreak. 
Infection-Control Service
Before the SARS outbreak, NYGH had only two infec-
tion-control practitioners (ICPs). During the outbreak,
additional ICPs were recruited, and hospital epidemiolo-
gists from other institutions arrived to create a system and
infrastructure for infection control. We expanded an extant
infection-control team to organize all the policies, systems,
and structures for future infection control. Extra staff
included a coordinator, four ICPs, a nurse clinician, a pub-
lic health nurse, an administrator, a hospital epidemiologist
(an infectious disease specialist with training in hospital
epidemiology), and a clinical infectious disease physician.
Members of this team made daily ward rounds to answer
questions and conduct surveillance for fever and symp-
toms. In addition, they met several times a week to review
policies, coordinate teaching, and address all other issues.
To ensure consistent levels of infection-control practice, a
system that reviewed the quality of practice was estab-
lished: it was essential for the ICPs to maintain some
degree of authority on these issues.
Because infection-control issues are vitally important, a
hospital should do the following: 1) identify an appropri-
ate number of ICPs for the hospital size (7); 2) include a
qualified hospital epidemiologist on the infection-control
team; 3) include a public health physician or designate on
the team; 4) maintain constant vigilance during symptom
surveillance; 5) sustain excellent standards of staff training
and communication and apply continuous monitoring of
infection-control practices; 6) ensure that all policies and
documentation go through this team; and 7) provide the
team with the necessary authority to work effectively
throughout the hospital.
Personal Protective Equipment 
and Fit-Testing of Respirators
The constant availability and use of personal protective
equipment (much of which was disposable) was essential
during the outbreak, including the following: N95 respira-
tors, goggles, face shields, hair nets, gowns, and scrub
suits. Specific policies and procedures were developed for
putting on and removing personal protective equipment.
For example, before entering a SARS patient’s room, a
staff member wore an N95 respirator, goggles, face shield,
hair net, a gown over scrubs, and two pairs of gloves. The
order in which personal protective equipment was
removed when a staff member exited a patient’s room was
exact. For example, inside the room by the door, the first
pair of gloves was removed, followed by the hair net, the
face shield, and the second pair of gloves; next, hands were
washed with quick-drying antiseptic solution, and the
gown was carefully removed; then the hands were washed
again before the staff member left the room. In the hall-
way, hands were washed, goggles removed and disposed
of, hands washed again, respirators removed, hands
washed, and finally, a new N95 respirator was donned.
During SARS II, the provincial government issued a direc-
tive requiring that respirators be fit-tested at all hospitals.
This recommendation proved to be difficult to implement
at NYGH because we were in the midst of an outbreak. 
We recommend that, in advance of an outbreak, hospi-
tals should do the following: 1) prepare clear policies on
the proper use of personal protective equipment during
such an outbreak; 2) ensure that adequate supplies of
essential items required for personal protective equipment
will be available or are already stocked; 3) have staff fit-
tested for respirators and document results or obtain forms
of higher level respiratory protection that do not require
fit-testing (e.g., loose-fitting powered air-purifying respi-
rators).
Education and Training
All staff had to be trained and educated on every aspect
of SARS, including the proper use of personal protective
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infection-control policies and procedures. At NYGH,
training was conducted by a group of nurse clinicians
assigned to each unit. Daily full-day, mandatory training
sessions for all staff working on the SARS wards were cre-
ated and included topics such as the proper way to don per-
sonal protective equipment, the psychological impact of
SARS, and general infection-control practices.
We recommend that hospitals do the following: 1)
include all departments in training, preferably in advance
of an outbreak; 2) develop a program for certification in
“Readiness to Manage an Infectious Medical Disaster
Outbreak”; 3) develop a “train-the-trainer” model together
with continued quality assurance monitoring. 
Public Health Outbreak Management Team
One unique feature of this outbreak was the formation
of a mobile public health outbreak management team. It
included two physicians, a manager, and five investigators
(either public health nurses or inspectors), who were sta-
tioned beside the hospital coordinators and infectious dis-
ease specialists and remained onsite 24 hours each day for
4 weeks. This setup promoted outstanding communication
and excellent relations between all parties, which allowed
rapid exchanges of information that led to swift contact
tracing and the quarantine of persons identified as having
had unprotected exposure to a SARS patient. The public
health nurses attended morning ward meetings to review
management plans for patients admitted overnight, fol-
lowed patient progress directly on the wards, and attended
the regular infection-control team meetings. 
We recommend that the healthcare system do the fol-
lowing during an outbreak: 1) facilitate effective commu-
nication between public health and hospital staff; and 2)
establish a common information technology platform that
allows for a streamlined, accessible flow of data between
jurisdictions.
Management and Administration 
At NYGH, a 24-hour command center administered all
the details connected to managing the outbreak and
answered all questions. Department heads met daily at
9:00 a.m., which allowed them to impart important infor-
mation to their staff. At 11:00 a.m., the SARS management
committee held a meeting at which all decisions for the
hospital were subsequently implemented. The key front-
line players—including unit managers from each ward,
infection control, infectious disease, and the chief of med-
icine—met daily to exchange information and properly
manage the outbreak. Forums were regularly held by the
hospital president to answer questions from the staff. All
media contacts went through the single public relations
department, to transmit a single message during this con-
troversial time. We recommend that hospital administra-
tions be prepared to play a pivotal role during such an out-
break.
SARS Follow-up Clinic
Patients recovering from SARS were discharged to
remain in quarantine at home for an additional 7–10 days.
Follow-up appointments were made for days 11 and 30
postdischarge. A single physician coordinated and ran the
SARS follow-up clinic out of the emergency department.
Again, a list of standard, step-by-step procedures was
made for the assessment, and a checklist was designed
(Figure 2). The physician assessed symptoms and
reviewed follow-up laboratory tests. Convalescent-phase
serologic tests were conducted 3–4 weeks after the onset of
symptoms, and if results of a polymerase chain reaction
test were positive for SARS-CoV, the test was repeated.
Follow-up chest x-rays and, occasionally, computed tomo-
graphic scans were performed. Apsychologist and a social
worker provided psychological assessment and support
during the follow-up visits. For SARS follow-up clinics in
other hospitals, we recommend that, using standardized
and organized methods, the hospitals prepare plans for an
extensive follow-up system. 
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Figure 2. Standardized follow-up checklist of patients with severe
acute respiratory syndrome. BP, blood pressure; CBC, complete
blood count; LDH, lactate dehydrogenase; AST, aspartate
transaminases; PCR, polymerase chain reaction; RR, respiratory
rate; P, pulse; ALP, alkaline phosphatase; CK, creatine kinase;
ESR, erythrocyte sedimentation rate; Ca, calcium; PO4, phos-
phate; Mg, magnesium; F/u, follow-up; NP, nasopharyngeal; PA,
posterior-anterior.Psychological and Psychosocial Management
Psychological and psychosocial support for both
patients and the entire hospital staff was necessary during
the SARS outbreak. Staff were affected by the fear of con-
tracting and transmitting this new disease; SARS patients
experienced stress because of their isolation, fear for their
lives, guilt, anger, anxiety, and depression. 
At NYGH, we put together a SARS psychological team
(including social workers, psychiatric crisis nurses, psy-
chiatrists, and infectious disease specialists) that devel-
oped a plan to manage the psychological impact on
patients and staff. Patients were seen at least twice weekly.
A social worker phoned each patient on days 2 and 6 post-
discharge to follow up. A psychiatric crisis-line phone
number was given to every patient in case he or she need-
ed urgent attention. An outpatient system with psychia-
trists was put in place to handle posttraumatic stress
syndrome. These services were also established for all hos-
pital staff. A quiet staff room was available for relaxation
or discussion with a team member. After the outbreak,
debriefing sessions were held with trained psychologists
and counselors. We recommend that hospitals’ psychiatry
departments, in conjunction with their hospital administra-
tion, develop a response plan for a crisis outbreak.
Research
Research is imperative during such an outbreak, partic-
ularly for a new disease. The physicians and staff who
were managing the outbreak had minimal time to do
research, but they had many urgent questions. At NYGH,
infectious disease and internal medicine physicians from
Health Canada, Toronto Public Health, and other organiza-
tions came in to help with the research. The ethics board
was prompt in attending to required approvals, often a
lengthy process. Funding for such emergency research—
another important factor—was provided. 
To facilitate emergency research, we recommend that
hospitals do the following: 1) identify potential members
for collaborative research before an outbreak; 2) establish
an expedient process for ethics approval; and 3) be pre-
pared to alert funding agencies for the need for additional
funding and support.
Conclusion
A multidisciplinary approach to manage the second
phase of the SARS outbreak in Toronto was undertaken at
NYGH. This successful approach was only possible with
the hard work and collaboration of many people as well as
open and active communication maintained among all
departments, employees, and patients. Many lessons, taken
from this experience, can be applied by hospitals preparing
themselves for such an outbreak. Finally, the policies, pro-
cedures, and documents developed at our institution and
others are freely available to other centers to review and
adapt as appropriate.
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